A Critique of Comrade Ashraf Dehghani’s Views

Introduction:

My acquaintance with the Iranian People’s Fadaee Guerrillas and its political literature dates back to the early 1990s. Incidentally, the first piece I read from this movement was Ashraf Dehghani’s famous work, Epic of Resistance (translated as “Torture and Resistance”). Reading this, followed by the organization’s two foundational theoretical works—Armed Struggle: Both Strategy and Tactic by Masoud Ahmadzadeh and Armed Struggle and the Refutation of the Theory of Survival by Amir Parviz Pouyan—had a profound impact on me.

Studying these texts deeply reshaped my perspective on armed struggle, especially as someone who had witnessed the rise of groups like the Baader-Meinhof in Germany and the Weather Underground in the United States during the 1970s; groups that took up arms based on romantic revolutionism and a naive understanding of armed struggle. Since then, I have eagerly followed the views of the People’s Fadaee Guerrillas and strived to understand the conditions of class struggle in Iran through their lens, for I believe many of their analyses regarding the fundamental issues of revolution in Iran are the most accurate and honest Marxist-Leninist assessments of the Iranian situation.

It is precisely in light of this trust and respect that I set out to critique some of Comrade Dehghani’s views regarding the 2022 uprising. I believe that despite the organization’s principled and correct positions on current affairs in Iran, certain shortcomings have emerged in some instances—including their assessment of the 2022 uprising.

In an article titled “An Analysis of the Current Revolutionary Movement” dated December 4, 2022, Comrade Dehghani presented views that, in my opinion, are subject to several flaws. The present piece serves as a critique of these views.

Rachel – May 20, 2026

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The present critique is built upon four fundamental objections:

1. Where does the foregone conclusion come from that the masses are revolutionary?
2. Where is the evidence to prove that the masses possess the level of class consciousness as to fully grasp that they must overthrow not only the regime that governs them, but the entire prevailing socio-economic system?
3. By what criteria can the 2022 uprising be considered a “revolution”? What analysis has the author provided to substantiate this claim? Without offering any evidence to show that this movement is anything more than an uprising, the author refers to it as the “current revolution”.
4. If the masses—as the author claims—possess class consciousness, how then can imperialist propaganda “inject” non-revolutionary ideas into them? This contradicts the author’s previous assertion regarding the revolutionary nature of the masses in Iran.

Since the author of the article in question has presented her views as a series of numbered thesis, I shall likewise refer to these specific theses in my critique below:

On thesis number 2:

As the author notes, the people are not unaware of their own oppression and deprivation; however, this does not necessarily imply an understanding of its true origin and cause. Blaming this or that dictatorship does not signify a “high level of consciousness” unless it encompasses the actual cause of their suffering—namely, the claws of imperialist relations which hold Iran in its grip through the dependent capitalist system.

The Comrade writes: “Their struggle against the mandatory hijab is itself a manifestation of these revolutionary women’s struggle against the entire Islamic Republic.” However, this claim only holds weight if we use the term “revolutionary” in a general and loose sense, rather than its Marxist definition. While many women possess a strong desire for personal freedoms, should their demands for civil liberties—including the right to choose what to wear and individual freedoms—be met within the framework of the current regime, they would not necessarily remain opposed to the Islamic Republic. Generally speaking, they neither possess a socio-economic organization nor do they have a clear understanding of the regime’s nature as a dependent capitalist state.

On thesis number 4:

the author writes that the slogans clearly demonstrate that the masses have “set their sights on the destruction of the entire system,” however she does not provide any evidence to her claim. Yes, the people are against the state apparatus or in other words, the regime, and they blame it’s existence as the source of their misery, but that is a far cry from wanting “to abolish the ruling exploitative capitalist order.” Without any proof, her proclamation represents wishful thinking rather than the existing objective reality of the masses’ level of consciousness.

On thesis number 6:

The author writes there: “… the current movement fully possesses the characteristics of a revolution… the masses themselves demanded recognition of their revolution and clearly chanted: “Don’t call it a protest, it’s now a revolution.“

The reality is that many use the term “revolution” in a general sense to emphasize a “major change”—much like the ‘Sexual Revolution’ of the 1960s, the “Digital Revolution” of the 90s, or the “Velvet and Rainbow Revolutions” following the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, in the Marxist sense, “revolution” refers not merely to spontaneous mass uprisings, but to a conscious and organized action; a movement grounded in a revolutionary theory and a revolutionary organization that maintains a deep link with the masses and is capable of leading them toward revolution. What we are witnessing here, conversely, are uprisings that are spontaneous, lacking revolutionary theory, and lacking revolutionary organization. Therefore, when the author claims “the current movement fully possesses the characteristics of a revolution,” she appears to be following a conventional, colloquial definition of revolution—one that essentially begins and ends with spontaneous mass uprising and the rejection of the status quo. Truly, on what evidence does the author’s analysis go beyond this quoted slogan? Since she provides no such evidence, I conclude that her inferences are based not on reality, but on subjective assumptions, hasty assessments, and an over-optimism regarding the people’s anger and defiance.

Indeed, the masses reject—with every fiber of their being—a regime that has imposed wretchedness and misery upon their lives for over four decades; yet they do so without a blueprint or program for its replacement. They possess neither a revolutionary theory nor a revolutionary organization to light the way. Therefore, given this objective reality, the author’s portrayal of the term ‘revolution’ is both vague and misleading. Terms such as ‘revolution,’ ‘revolutionary forces,’ ‘revolutionary masses,’ and ‘revolutionary movement’ appear at least 45 times throughout this article in reference to the spontaneous uprising of 2022—yet not once does the author provide a Marxist-Leninist exposition of this political label.

On thesis number 9:

In the author’s commentary on this thesis, one can trace a ‘mechanical adaptation’ of certain elements from The Theory of Armed Struggle. The author posits:

At present, the absence of an organized working class with its independent political organ, and the lack of its leadership within the movement, constitutes a fundamental deficiency in the current revolution—a deficiency that must be rectified through the continuation of revolutionary struggles in various forms, even after the overthrow of the Islamic Republic, to create the conditions for its emergence.

According to Masoud Ahmadzadeh’s perspective, the essential elements and instruments of revolution—including the party of the working class (the Communist Party, or the very deficiencies the author mentions)—are attained only through the process of “armed struggle” under the leadership of “a revolutionary organization” and in the course of “its expansion”. It is within this process, according to Masoud Ahmadzadeh, that ‘various forms’ of struggle find their meaning and feasibility. However, the question remains: are the struggles we are witnessing today the same armed movement to which Ahmadzadeh refers? Certainly not!

The author speaks of ‘revolutionary struggles’ as if armed struggle were indeed the primary line of action—the driving and guiding force—in the current situation. However, in reality, despite the combative and militant spirit observed in the 2022 uprising, this movement remains a far cry from ‘armed struggle’ as Ahmadzadeh defined it. In fact, no such movement exists today; what we see instead are scattered instances of radical action—such as throwing Molotov cocktails or, in some cases, armed attacks—which appear to stem more from rage than from a coherent revolutionary theory. How, then, will this massive deficiency be rectified? The author offers no explanation. At first glance, her rhetoric resembles Ahmadzadeh’ words, but since the 2022 uprising lacks the core elements of a ‘revolutionary movement’—namely, revolutionary theory and organization—she has effectively decontextualized Ahmadzadeh’s clear perspective, stripping it of its essential framework.

On thesis number 13:

As Lenin famously stated: “Without revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary movement.” Do we witness the presence of such a theory here? No! Therefore, since this uprising is not guided by a revolutionary theory and organization, branding it a “current revolution” is a hasty and groundless claim. The author’s approach is fundamentally flawed because this oversimplification lacks any Marxist basis. Truly, how are we to distinguish between a “genuine revolutionary movement” and a “mere desire for regime change”? In my view, the author’s methodology stands in direct contradiction to Marxism-Leninism.

On theses numbers 15, 16, 20, 22, 23, 24:

The “imported” slogan “Woman, Life, Freedom”—which imperialists opportunistically exploited to mask and divert the acute economic demands of the working class and the oppressed poor—was nonetheless embraced (rightly or wrongly) across various strata of Iranian society. Throughout numerous theses, however, the author fails to provide any analysis as to why a segment of the Iranian people adopted it so readily. Only in Thesis 22 does she finally state: “The popular forces… repeat this slogan without further reflection on its true meaning,” or in thesis 24, “… even if this slogan is repeated by the grieving masses of Iran with their own interpretations…”. While this assessment by the author is indeed correct, it stands in direct contradiction to her earlier assertions describing the people as “conscious masses” and “revolutionary masses,” and their movement as a “revolutionary movement.”

In fact, how could the “revolutionary” masses align themselves with such a slogan? Had this “imposed,” “vague,” and “diversionary” slogan not taken root and resonated within the oppressed strata of Iranian society, it would never have crossed their lips.

Furthermore, the mere fact that an idea or slogan originates elsewhere does not strip it of its validity or significance for people in other locations. Consider “socialism,” which originated in Europe, or “liberalism,” which spread across the globe from the French Revolution. Regardless of whether an ideology is noble or base, can people not interpret it as meaningful and expressive of their own aspirations—especially in light of those very “fundamental deficiencies” the author herself has acknowledged?

On theses numbers 25, 26 and 27:

Referring to the Iranian working class, the author posits: “The working class is an anti-capitalist social force…”. However, this assertion holds scientific validity only if we are speaking of a working class armed with socialist consciousness. Otherwise, the aforementioned claim is nothing more than an abstract generalization. Therefore, it must first be clarified that we are referring to a class defined by such characteristics. But does the Iranian working class currently possess such attributes? Certainly not! In other words, we cannot adopt an essentialist understanding of the working class—meaning we cannot assume that the workers of a given society are inherently revolutionary simply by virtue of being workers. Presently, not only the Iranian working class but those in many other countries lack class consciousness (i.e., socialist consciousness). Consequently, how can this class be “anti-capitalist,” let alone grasp—within the specific context of Iranian society—the mechanisms of “dependent capitalism” that has the nation by the throat? It is true that in their relentless daily struggle for survival, workers feel and experience exploitation and understand their dire economic situation in a very basic sense; however, this is miles away from possessing class consciousness and becoming a class-for-itself.

They possess neither a “revolutionary vanguard” to lead them nor a “revolutionary theory” to guide them. On the contrary, and perhaps even worse, considering the accessibility of social media, a significant segment of the masses has fallen into the trap of ‘petit-bourgeois’ thinking. Nonetheless, by insisting on branding this uprising a “revolution” and repeatedly labeling the masses as “revolutionary,” the author effectively misleads and diverts the reader’s mind from the Marxist definition of revolution. In doing so, she has reduced the Marxist concept of ‘revolution’ to a colloquial and hollow level—a perception that lacks any theoretical or analytical framework.

On thesis number 29:

The author explains that: ”Moreover, from the heart of such a bloody revolution… new poems, songs, and artistic works with class and revolutionary content should emerge…, yet the artistic works currently circulating in the virtual sphere carry a different tone within which the true nature and content of the present revolutionary movement are not fully reflected as they should be….“

But, it is only natural that when a “revolutionary movement”—that is, one grounded in a revolutionary theory—does not exist, art cannot reflect a “revolutionary movement.” Art is the creative reflection of reality and material life. Consequently, in the absence of a “revolutionary theory,” a “revolutionary vanguard,” or a “revolutionary organization” to construct such a movement, this heroic uprising—born out of a furious desperation—can be nothing more than a scattered and spontaneous rebellion against an oppressive and ruthless regime. The author does, however, attribute this to the “success of reactionary forces in undermining the voice of the Left and its influence on the people’s struggle,” as well as “brutal repression.” But, she herself notes that in 2017 and 2018, despite the presence of those same factors, radical slogans still emerged! In other words, the author provides the very evidence that contradicts her own argument.

It seems the primary source of the author’s bewilderment and confusion lies in the fact that the 2022 mass unrest in Iran was, in reality, a spontaneous uprising—rather than the “revolution” she assumes it to be. Consequently, this uprising produced exactly what was within its capacity; for instance, the song “Baraye” by Shervin Hajipour, which even reached beyond Iran’s national borders.

Regarding the subject of cultural production, I urge the author to read the following article: [Thought, Reality, and Revolution in the Mirror of Poetry]

On thesis number 32:

There the author writes: “Workers…have risen up to overthrow the old capitalist order ruling Iran, and the demonic domination of the Islamic Republic as the guardian of that order, and by continuing their revolution to traverse a path whose end is the establishment of a socialist economy in society.”

As Marxist-Leninists, it is self-evident to us that the Islamic Republic is a puppet regime safeguarding the interests of imperialists and dependent capitalists in Iran. For the Iranian masses, however, this reality is neither clear nor established. What they experience firsthand—at the cost of daily suffering—is that this ruthless regime is the architect of their immense misery. It is also quite clear that while the working class attains a certain level of consciousness through its daily economic struggles, this does not equate to achieving socialist (revolutionary) consciousness. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the masses are unanimous in the struggle against capitalism, or that they understand how the dependent capitalist order keeps them in chains. In fact, it is precisely this lack of understanding that prevents them from initiating a “revolution,” let alone sustaining one.

Furthermore, the author posits a general dictum:

The revolutionary actions taking place today—from burning Basij bases and attacking police stations to efforts toward armament and the revolutionary execution of the regime’s repressive agents—indicate the formation of organizational relations, however nascent, among Iran’s militant youth. The growth and maturation of this process, even following the overthrow of the Islamic Republic, will stand as one of the most significant achievements of the people in the current revolution.

However, this dictum is a flawed and warped conclusion.  Why? Because the very actions she cites (such as attacking police stations and executing agents and so on) would ideally become obsolete upon the regime’s collapse. It is contradictory to suggest that tactics necessitated by repression should ‘grow and mature’ after that repression has ended, unless the political process is destined to move in a repetitive loop.